Protein Pharmaceuticals: Altering the Scope of Product Patents to Accomodate Recombinant DNA Technology by Field, Bret
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 15 | Number 2 Article 6
1-1-1992
Protein Pharmaceuticals: Altering the Scope of
Product Patents to Accomodate Recombinant
DNA Technology
Bret Field
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bret Field, Protein Pharmaceuticals: Altering the Scope of Product Patents to Accomodate Recombinant DNA Technology, 15 Hastings
Comm. & Ent. L.J. 495 (1992).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol15/iss2/6
Protein Pharmaceuticals: Altering the






I. The Patent A ct ............................................ 495
A. Recombinant DNA .................................... 498
B. The Evolution of the Patent Act Governing
Recombinant DNA Inventions ......................... 500
1. The Product Claim ................................ 501
2. The Purified Product of Nature Claim .............. 501
3. The Scope of the Purified Protein Patent ............ 502
II. The Orphan Drug Act ..................................... 504
A. Potential Conflict Between the Patent Act and the
Orphan Drug Act ..................................... 506
1. The Orphan Drug Act of 1983 ..................... 506
2. The 1985 Amendment ............................. 507
3. Legislative History of the 1985 Amendment ........ 508
B. Preliminary Application of the Act to Drugs Created
Using Recombinant DNA Technology ................. 510
C. New Regulations ...................................... 511
III. Altering the Scope of Product Patents Granted to Protein
Pharm aceuticals ........................................... 513
A. Courts Receptive to Change ........................... 513
1. The Composition of Erythropoietin (EPO) .......... 514
2. The District Court's Decision ...................... 514
3. The Federal Circuit Decision ....................... 516
a. Literal Reading-Upholding the Scripps Clinic
R ule ........................................... 516
b. Alternative Reading ............................ 517
i. Two Suggested Directions .......................... 518
ii. A Third Direction ................................. 518
IV . Conclusion ................................................ 520




The use of recombinant DNA technology' in the manufacture of
protein pharmaceuticals revolutionized the pharmaceutical industry in
the 1980s. These technological advancements raise new legal issues con-
cerning the protection and regulation of drugs created using recombinant
DNA. Two specific bodies of law, the Patent Act2 and the Orphan Drug
Act,3 have traditionally had a significant impact on the marketing rights
of pharmaceutical manufacturers. Because both acts were passed prior
to the widespread use of recombinant DNA techniques, courts and the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) have had to adapt the law to the
new technology as best they could. These adaptations have led to signifi-
cant changes in the rights of pharmaceutical manufacturers who use re-
combinant DNA techniques.
In making such adaptations, the courts have taken a different ap-
proach than the FDA. This note explores this divergence and argues
that the courts should emulate the FDA and alter the scope of product
patents granted for protein pharmaceuticals. Section I analyzes how
courts apply the Patent Act to protein pharmaceutical inventions. Sec-
tion II explores the judicial interpretation of the Orphan Drug Act and
the FDA's recent regulations relating to recombinant DNA inventions.
Finally, Section III argues that courts should take an approach similar to
the FDA's interpretation of different drugs in delineating the scope of
product patents for protein pharmaceuticals.
I
The Patent Act
The Patent Act was drafted to protect the inventor and promote the
enrichment of society with new technological advances. The Patent Act
originates in the United States Constitution, which provides that "[t]he
Congress shall have the power... To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . .,
The policy underlying the Patent Act is twofold. First, there is a belief
that an inventor should be rewarded for her work and others should not
be allowed to reap a profit from the pioneer inventor's efforts. 5 Second,
there is an assumption that providing economic incentives to inventors
1. DNA is a common abbreviation for deoxyribonucleic acid. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 21-43 for a brief explanation of recombinant DNA technology.
2. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1988).
3. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-ee (1988).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
5. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 8 (1966).
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will encourage the creation of new technology, thus enriching the collec-
tive knowledge of society.6
To realize these policies, the Patent Act grants the inventor a statu-
tory monopoly.7 The Patent Act provides the inventor of a qualifying
invention with the exclusive right to make, use, and sell the patented
invention for seventeen years.8 Because the Patent Act grants a statutory
monopoly, courts usually will not provide protection beyond what is
clearly provided in the patent statutes.9 For example, the U.S. Supreme
Court refused to interpret a claim in such a fashion that would effectively
extend the scope of protection beyond United States borders.10 Courts
interpret patents narrowly because monopolies are commonly thought to
be contrary to free market economies.I1 Additionally, monopolies gener-
ally violate antitrust law.
12
However, patents are extremely valuable when the statutory require-
ments are met. In the case of pharmaceuticals, the patent period may
extend beyond the usual seventeen years.13 Thus, owners of valid patents
are quick to guard their rights against perceived infringers. 14 Courts
have strong remedies to enforce the rights of inventors. These remedies
include the granting of injunctions,15 treble damages, 16 and attorneys'
fees. 17
Protein pharmaceutical inventors, like all inventors, must meet the
strict statutory requirements if they wish to obtain patent protection for
their products. I" Securing patent protection is important for protein
pharmaceutical manufacturers because the rights under such protection
6. Id. at 9. The premise is that if an inventor has an economic incenfive to invent, she
will be more likely to create and subsequently enrich society with her creations.
7. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988).
8. Id.
9. See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
10. Id. The Court refused to enjoin the defendant from exporting the parts of a patented
combination invention where the parts were then assembled into a working whole in foreign
lands, because a contrary ruling would grant the plaintiff extraterritorial rights not provided in
the patent statutes.
11. LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 25-26 (1977)
(monopolies result in prices contradictory to the prices set by pure supply and demand forces).
12. Id. at 29.
13. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417,
98 Stat. 1585 (1984); see also H.R. REP. No. 153, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1984), reprinted in
1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 301, 305.
14. See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200,. 1204 (Fed. Cir.)
(Amgen filed an infringement suit against Chugai the same day Amgen received its patent),
cert. denied sub nom. Genetics Inst., Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991) (mem.).
15. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1988).
16. Id. § 284.
17. Id. § 285.
18. See generally Amgen, Inc., 927 F.2d at 1200.
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can be extremely lucrative.' 9 However, as courts have wrestled with the
application of patent rights to pharmaceuticals developed through re-
combinant DNA technology, the scope of the rights granted has
changed.2" To understand this change, it is helpful first to understand
the science behind recombinant DNA technology.
A. Recombinant DNA
Recombinant DNA technology exploits the natural process whereby
organisms synthesize the proteins that they need in order to exist.2' The
natural process of protein synthesis begins with the genetic material of
the cell.22 A gene is a cell's blueprint for the proteins that a cell must
create in order to carry out its normal functions. 23 A gene refers to a
particular strand of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 24 which is composed
of nucleotides, that are in turn derived from nucleic acids. 25 The gene is
actually a code consisting of differing molecules of nucleotides linked to-
gether in a specific sequence. The order of these nucleotides codes for a
specific protein.26
When a cell needs a certain protein,27 it synthesizes messenger
ribonucleic acid (mRNA) using the genetic code located in its chromo-
somal material as a template. 28 The process by which mRNA is synthe-
sized from the DNA template is known as transcription. 29 The mRNA,
after moving from the nucleus to the cytoplasm, is then read by ribo-
somes, which act as decoders of the genetic message. 30 The ribosomes
direct the synthesis of the growing proteins using the genetic message as
19. Sales at Amgen, a biotech concern that markets recombinant protein products,
reached $700 million in 1991 and were expected to exceed $1 billion in 1992. Andrew
Erdman, How to Keep that Family Feeling, FORTUNE, Apr. 6, 1992, at 95.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 44-71.
21. JAMES W. FRISTROM & MICHAEL T. CLEGG, PRINCIPLES OF GENETICS 410 (2d ed.
1988).
22. JAMES D. WATSON ET AL., RECOMBINANT DNA: A SHORT COURSE 32-33 (1983).
23. Id. at 32.
24. Id. at 19.
25. FRISTROM & CLEGG, supra note 21, at 15. The nucleotide is actually composed of a
purine or pyrimidine base linked to a sugar-phosphate backbone. In this way, a long chain is
created with the various nucleotide bases, such as thymine, cytosine, guanine, and adenine,
extending from the chain.
26. See WATSON ET AL., supra note 22, at 32.
27. Cells need enzymes to coordinate their complex chemical reactions, and enzymes are
made of proteins. Id. at 3.
28. Id. at 33. This process is accomplished by opening up the double helix in which the
DNA is arranged and using the "sense" strand as a template.
29. Id. mRNA differs slightly from DNA in chemical structure.
30. Id. at 35. Ribosomes are RNA molecules located within the cytoplasm that can read
the mRNA and use the message as a blueprint for building the protein.
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a guide.31 This process, known as translation, is "so named because the
nucleotide language of nucleic acids is translated into the amino acid lan-
guage of proteins. '32  This natural event is the basis of recombinant
DNA technology.
In recombinant DNA technology, scientists manipulate this natural
event to control the way a cell produces a desired protein. One goal is to
obtain larger and purer quantities of a desired protein than can be ob-
tained from natural sources. To realize this goal, the scientist first cre-
ates a library of the chromosomal DNA that contains DNA
corresponding to the desired protein.33 Next, the scientist screens the
library for plasmids or phages containing portions of the chromosomal
DNA. The goal is to obtain the plasmid that contains the DNA se-
quence for the desired protein.34 The library is screened by using an
mRNA probe that identifies the plasmid containing the gene for the de-
sired protein. 35 The screened plasmid then becomes the vector,36 which
acts as a vehicle for inserting the gene into the new host cell.37 When a
vector successfully incorporates the isolated gene into a host cell, the
host cell is said to be transformed. 38 By selecting the proper host cell,
scientists can manipulate the desired protein,39 coded for by the inserted
gene. The result is that the desired protein is produced in greater quanti-
ties and in a purer form than it would be in nature. 4°
Recombinant DNA techniques are gaining popularity as a means of
creating pharmaceuticals based on naturally occurring proteins. For ex-
ample, human growth hormone (hGH), identical to naturally occurring
hGH, is currently marketed as the drug Humatrope. 4' Humatrope is
given to patients deficient in natural human growth hormone and can
prevent dwarfism. 42 To make Humatrope, Eli Lilly Co. uses recombi-
31. Id. at 36-37.
32. Id. at 34.
33. FRISTROM & CLEGG, supra note 21, at 412-22.
34. Id. at 423-26.
35. Id. at 424.
36. A vector, such as a plasmid or a phage, is a vehicle for moving the isolated gene into a
host cell. Id.; see also In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (patent sought on a
process for linking a desired gene to a gene that could be controlled by altering the host cell's
medium).
37. FRISTROM & CLEGG, supra note 21, at 423-26.
38. Id. at 775.
39. A host cell believes the gene to be its own and carries out the directions of the gene to
create a protein. In other words, the gene uses the host cell as a factory to create its end
product. When a protein is produced by a cell the gene is said to be "expressed."
40. For an example of how recombinant DNA is used in insulin production see FRIS-
TROM & CLEGG, supra note 21, at 442-43.




nant DNA techniques as a source of hGH. Eli Lilly then purifies the
hGH and places it in a pharmaceutically acceptable form.4"
B. The Evolution of the Patent Act Governing Recombinant DNA
Inventions
To qualify for patent protection, an invention must fall within the
subject matter required by 35 U.S.C. § 101, which provides:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful im-
provements thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the condi-
tions and requirements of this title."
Three types of patent protection are available to the eligible inven-
tor. The inventor may take out either a product patent,45 use patent,46 or
a process patent.47
43. A pharmaceutically acceptable form might be a pill, capsule, or serum that can be
injected.
44. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
45. See generally Elizabeth F. Enayati, Comment, Enemies to Innovation: Protecting Bio-
technology Inventions, 5 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 435, 441 (1989).
46. "A use patent covers all the uses of a drug described in the patent, but not the drug
itself or any use of the drug described in the product patent." H.R. REP. No. 153, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 5 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 301, 305. Before the holder of a use patent
can utilize her patent, she must obtain a license from the owner of the original product patent.
A holder who fails to obtain a license will infringe the product patent. This type of protection
is not as strong or as broad as the product patent claim because it does not preclude other
inventors from obtaining alternative use patents. Id.
47. The process claim is the narrowest of the three types of claims. "A process patent
covers a method of manufacturing the drug, but not the drug or its uses." Id. No patent can
issue for the product of a new process if the product is already covered by an existing patent;
only the new process may be patented. Further, this process patent cannot be utilized until the
underlying product patent expires or the owner of the process patent obtains a license from the
product patent owner.
The Federal Circuit has granted process patents to biotechnology companies, and the
Patent and Trademark Office has indicated that a claim encompassing the process of linking
genes can form proper subject matter for a process patent. In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894 (Fed.
Cir. 1988). In O'Farrell, the patent at issue claimed the process of linking a desired gene to a
gene that could be controlled by changing the medium on which the host cell was living. The
purpose of such a gene linkage is to gain control of the expression of the linked gene. The
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) found that the process would have been the
proper subject of a process patent. Nevertheless, the patent claim was invalid because it failed
to transcend the prior art.
The CAFC upheld a process patent in Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802
F.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The process Hybritech sought to patent was an immunometric
assay or "sandwich assay." The sandwich assay uses monoclonal antibodies to detect and
quantify the amount of antigen in body fluids. The court validated the process patent issued to
the plaintiff even though all the materials used in the process were known in the prior art.
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1. The Product Claim
The product claim provides the strongest protection for pharmaceu-
tical inventions. It is the most comprehensive of the three types of
claims,48 encompassing machines, manufactures, and compositions of
matter.49 In pharmaceutical inventions, a product patent covers an ac-
tive ingredient of a drug and all of its uses.50 Thus, if an inventor obtains
a product patent for an active ingredient, the inventor can theoretically
enjoin competitors from any use that ingredient has, or might have, for
the duration of the patent. This power has the effect of granting the
product patent holder a monopoly on the active ingredient, hence the
desirability of product patents to pharmaceutical manufacturers.
2. The Purified Product of Nature Claim
To obtain a product patent on an active ingredient of a drug created
through recombinant DNA methods, the inventor must meet the rigor-
ous statutory requirements discussed above.51 Often the active ingredi-
ent in such a drug is a naturally occurring protein. Fundamental to the
patent scheme is that a "product of nature" cannot be patented.52 "A
true 'product of nature' does not constitute a machine, composition of
matter, or manufacture. This is true even though the claimant is the first
person to discover or identify the product."" Thus, a pharmaceutical
inventor must show that the protein sought to be patented differs from
the protein that occurs in nature.
Courts and the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) have responded
to this problem. They conclude that when a protein is claimed in a more
purified form than its naturally occurring state, the protein is a manufac-
tured, rather than a naturally occurring, product.54 Accordingly, the
PTO awards, and courts uphold, patents in this situation. Commenta-
tors agree that a pharmaceutical manufacturer must show that it has ob-
tained a naturally occurring protein in a more purified state before it can
48. The breadth of the product patent is evidenced in Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v.
Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1987), where the product patent covered puri-
fied protein obtained not only conventionally, but also by using recombinant means.
49. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
50. H.R. REP. No. 153, supra note 46, at 5, reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 305.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 7-20.
52. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
53. DONALD CHISUM, PATENTS §§ 1-33 (1988).
54. See generally Kate Murashige, Section 102/103 Issues in Biotechnology Patent Prose-
cution, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 294 (1988-1989) (PTO is willing to grant protection to a protein
product).
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obtain product patent protection for that protein." Indeed, one com-
mentator states that "[a]ny significant alteration of the product from its
natural state would seem to make the product a 'manufacture' and re-
move the product of nature problem."56 Thus, a protein that is presented
in a substantially more purified state than its naturally occurring state
will qualify for a product patent.5
7
One federal district court has also suggested that a manufacturer
can hold a valid product patent for a protein that occurs naturally if that
protein is claimed in a purified form.58 In Scripps Clinic & Research
Found. v. Genentech, Inc., the plaintiffs claimed to have a product patent
for a purified form of Factor VIII:C, a protein that plays an integral part
in the formation of blood clots. 9 The Factor VIII:C in question was
purified from pigs' blood. The Scripps Clinic court, in a footnote, sup-
ported the patentability of the protein, even though it was a product of
nature.' The question of whether one could patent a purified protein,
such as purified Factor VIII:C, was not raised.6 Thus, the court en-
dorsed product patent availability for purified proteins.
3. The Scope of the Purified Protein Patent
Currently, courts define the scope of the product patent very
broadly. For example, the Scripps Clinic court found that the scope of
the product claim encompasses not only purified proteins from human
and pig sources,6' but also proteins produced using recombinant DNA
55. "It is now very clear, if claims passed to issue can be used as a guide, that just because
a material of interest exists in some form in nature, its patentability in a form that does not
exist in nature is not precluded." Id. at 301.
56. CHISUM, supra note 53, at 1-35.
57. Id.
It appears that the act of human intervention must impart to the product a new form,
quality, property or combination not present in the original article. Purification has
been held to be a basis of a substantial change in the characteristics, functions or
activities of the naturally occurring material in the case of chemical compounds. Pu-
rification has also been held to give rise to a substantial change in the nature of the
naturally occurring, but biologically pure microbial culture sufficient for
patentability.
Thomas G. Wiseman, Biotechnology Patent Practice-A Primer, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 399 (1988-
1989).
58. See Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D.
Cal. 1987).
59. Id. at 1389. Factor VIII:C is involved in the blood clotting cascade and is useful in
treating hemophiliacs.
60. See id. Because the court did not attack or question the basic presumption that the
product patent was valid, one can infer that it was.
61. See id.
62. Id.
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methods, such as the protein created by the defendants.6" The defend-
ants were prevented from marketing their recombinant Factor VIII:C
because the recombinant protein fell within the scope of the plaintiff's
product claim." In coming to this conclusion the court focused on the
end product and not the method of creation. Thus, the holder of a valid
purified protein patent has a wide statutory monopoly under the Scripps
Clinic holding.6 5
The court's interpretation was both helpful and problematic to phar-
maceutical inventors using recombinant DNA methods. It was helpful
in the sense that a product patent can now be obtained for future proteins
created through recombinant methods. Thus, the makers of an invention
created by recombinant DNA methods are able to get patent protection
through a product claim, provided that the protein is not already covered
by an earlier product claim.66 The scope of the product patent is wide,
encompassing both proteins purified from natural sources and proteins
purified from recombinant sources.
The Scripps Clinic result was problematic, however, because if a pu-
rified product patent already exists on a certain protein, that protein can-
not be manufactured by another inventor using recombinant DNA
technology. This is true even if the recombinant DNA protein is supe-
rior to the prior protein purified from natural sources. This result has
been criticized as stifling the advancement of protein pharmaceutical
manufacturing using recombinant means of production.67 Opponents of
this holding maintain that product patents do not encompass products
created by recombinant DNA technology. 68 One commentator has sug-
gested that products of recombinant DNA technology should not be pre-
cluded by earlier product claims encompassing proteins purified by
conventional means, because of the overriding policy of promoting this
63. Id. at 1391.
64. Id. at 1395.
65. The Scripps Clinic court held that the product patent was broad enough to cover
defendant's recombinant Factor VIII:C. Thus, the manufacturer of the recombinant DNA
product was found to have infringed the patent of the manufacturer of the purified protein,
even though the recombinant DNA product was manufactured in an entirely different manner.
Because courts are willing to give broad product protection to purified protein products, the
holder of a valid purified protein product patent should be able to prevent a competitor from
making, using, or selling the patented protein. This should be the case even if the competing
protein were produced by an entirely different method.
66. See Scripps Clinic, 666 F. Supp. at 1379.
67. Harold C. Wegner, Purified Protein Patents: "A Legal Process Gone Berserk?," 12
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 187 (1990).
68. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 706 F. Supp. 94, 103 (D. Mass. 1989),
rev'd on other grounds, 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991), and cert. denied sub nom. Genetics
Inst., Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991) (mem.).
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valuable new science.69 The courts were not initially receptive to this
argument. In fact, one court concluded "[i]nfringement of product or
composition claims depends upon the equivalence of the product ingredi-
ents and upon the substantial similarity of the proportions of those ingre-
dients, not upon the process used to manufacture the product."7 °
The scope of the product patent in Scripps Clinic, as interpreted by
the Northern District of California, is clearly too broad. A narrower
interpretation would better promote recombinant DNA and further the
policy underlying the Patent Act. One author has suggested that the
Patent Act be legislatively amended to abolish product patents for pro-
tein pharmaceuticals, allowing only process patents to be granted.7'
Although this is one way to address the problem, it may not be a viable
one given the time involved in passing new legislation. Another solution
is to follow the lead of the FDA, which has altered its interpretation of
"new drug" as defined in the Orphan Drug Act. This solution is further
developed in Section III.
II
The Orphan Drug Act
In 1983 Congress passed the Orphan Drug Act "to facilitate the
development of drugs for rare diseases or conditions."72 The broad policy
behind passage of the law was to provide an incentive for companies to
make drugs that would otherwise not be made.73 These drugs were des-
ignated "Orphan Drugs" because their demand was not great enough to
make their production profitable. 74 One reason production may not be
profitable for these drugs is that the cost of development is too high.75
Such high production costs can discourage the development of a drug
with low profitability projections. 76 The Orphan Drug Act addresses this
concern by lowering the cost barrier through exclusive marketing rights,
tax breaks, and administrative streamlining.77
69. Wegner, supra note 67.
70. Amgen, Inc., 706 F. Supp. at 104.
71. See Michael S. Greenfield, Note, Recombinant DNA Technology: A Science Struggling
with the Patent Act, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1082-90 (1992).
72. H.R. REP. No. 840, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 1, at 5 (1982).
73. Genentech, Inc. v. Bowen, 676 F. Supp. 301, 302-03 (D.D.C. 1987).
74. Id.
75. "A pharmaceutical company often must spend $80 million or more to develop a single
new drug." Id. at 302.
76. Congress designed the Act "to combat the general unwillingness of pharmaceutical
manufacturers to invest in the development of commercial drugs for the treatment of diseases
which, although devastating to their victims, afflict too small a proportion of the population to
make them commercially viable." Id. at 302-03.
77. Id. at 303.
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A drug may also suffer low profitability projections because the tar-
get population of the drug is small.7 Congress has defined the maximum
"orphan" population to be 200,000 patients.7 9 The 200,000 patient pop-
ulation was created to provide a firm category for drug makers,"° al-
lowing the prospective maker to easily project whether the new drug will
qualify for designation under the Act. Recently, this qualification was
questioned, and its modification was the subject of proposed legislation.8"
However, the 200,000 patient population limit remains a valid part of the
Orphan Drug Act. 2
The Orphan Drug Act grants several benefits to fulfill its statutory
purpose.8 3 The Act's benefits include exclusive marketing rights, 4 tax
credits, 5 and a special board designed to administer the Act.86 The mar-
keting exclusivity provision is probably the most valuable benefit to or-
phan drug makers,87 because it provides a seven-year statutory monopoly
for a particular use of a drug. Although the statutory monopoly under
the Act is shorter than that provided under the patent laws,88 it is still
attractive. In addition, the Act has two advantages over traditional pat-
ent protection. 89 First, the drug manufacturer does not have to work
under the complex Patent Term Restoration process.90 Second, orphan
78. "When the potential market for a drug is small-because the number of persons af-
flicted with the particular disease or condition which the drug treats is relatively small-it may
be impossible for the manufacturer to recover its sizeable research and development invest-
ment, much less realize an acceptable return on that investment." Id. at 302.
79. 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(c)(2) (1988). See also David Richardson, The Orphan Drug Tax
Credit. An Inadequate Response to an Ill Defined Problem, 6 AM. J. TAX POL. 135 (1987).
80. Li-Hsien Rin-Laures & Diane Janofsky, Note, Recent Developments Concerning the
Orphan Drug Act, 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 269, 274 (1991).
81. Id. at 280-81.
82. Id. at 277.
83. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-ee (1988).
84. Id. § 360cc.
85. 26 U.S.C. § 28 (1988).
86. The legislation accomplishes this goal by clarifying the approval process for or-
phan drugs; by providing a tax credit equal to 90 percent of the cost of conducting
clinical trials as an incentive to develop orphan drugs; by offering exclusive market-
ing rights on unpatentable orphan drugs for a period of seven years; and by establish-
ing an "Orphan Products Board" to coordinate the activities of Federal agencies
involved in drug research and regulations.
H.R. REP. No. 840, supra note 72, at 5, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3577, 3583.
87. "Market exclusivity differs from and in many cases is more valuable than patent pro-
tection." Cynthia Thomas, Note, Re-Assessing the Orphan Drug Act, 23 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBs. 413, 426 (1989).
88. The Patent Act provides for a 17-year, rather than 7-year, exclusive marketing provi-
sion. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
89. See generally Martha J. Carter & Alan R. Bennett, Developments in Orphan Drugs, 44




drug exclusivity begins upon approval. 9 ' One commentator has observed
that "some manufacturers have discovered that the Act can be used as a
substitute for Patent protection for profitable drugs." 92 This is a problem
because some makers are using the Act to circumvent the patent laws
even though their drugs are profitable. The issue of whether orphan
drugs should be profitable is beyond the scope of this note. However,
this circumvention raises the issue of whether overlapping protection ex-
ists between the Patent Act and the Orphan Drug Act.
A. Potential Conflict Between the Patent Act and the Orphan Drug Act
Since both the Orphan Drug Act93 and the Patent Act 94 have such a
large impact on the conduct of protein pharmaceutical manufacturers, it
is informative to explore how the acts relate to one another. Specifically,
because some manufacturers appear to be using the Orphan Drug Act to
bypass patent requirements, 95 is it possible that a conflict exists between
the two acts? The short answer to that question is "no." However, to
arrive at that answer one has to examine the bridge between the Patent
Act and the Orphan Drug Act, supplied by the statutes governing New
Drug Approvals (NDA). 96
1. The Orphan Drug Act of 1983
The Orphan Drug Act, enacted in 1983, originally applied only to
drugs that were not eligible for patent protection. The Act sought to
encourage the production of these unpatentable drugs.97 Indeed, "the
exclusivity provision of the Act was designed to complement the patent
laws, filling gaps which might leave orphan drug manufacturers
unprotected."9 8
It can be inferred from courts interpreting the legislative history of
the Act that the Orphan Drug Act was not meant to compete with the
91. Id. at 627.
92. Id. at 629.
93. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-ee (1988).
94. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1988).
95. Carter & Bennett, supra note 89, at 629, 630.
96. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)-(m) (1988).
97. A drug can be unpatentable for several reasons. A patent can be denied if the drug is
obvious under § 103 of the patent laws. A drug disclosed in a prior art is obvious and thus
ineligible for patent protection. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988). Likewise, a use patent will be denied
if the use was anticipated in prior scientific work. Id. The Act seeks to fill a gap in the patent
laws. "The Subcommittee's survey indicated that a substantial number of orphan drugs are
not patentable. In order to provide some incentive for the development of these particular
orphan drugs, the Committee's bill includes an exclusive marketing right for the sponsor of
such a drug." H.R. REP. No. 840, supra note 72, at 11, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3583.
98. Genentech, Inc. v. Bowen, 676 F. Supp. 301, 304 (D.D.C. 1987).
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Patent Act by providing conflicting protection.99 On the contrary, the
Act was designed to avoid granting protection to a drug which should
rightly be granted protection under the Patent Act."° For example, a
manufacturer could not obtain orphan drug status if the drug could
either be covered by a product patent or a use patent.'0" Thus the origi-
nal provision, which precluded a drug which was patentable from ob-
taining Orphan Drug designation, also served as insurance against
simultaneous protection being granted for the same drug by the PTO and
the Orphan Drug Board.
2. The 1985 Amendment
The 1985 Amendment to the Orphan Drug Act created the question
of overlapping protection. In 1985 Congress amended the Act to elimi-
nate the requirement that the drug not be patentable. Congress passed
the amendment to "provide further incentives to pharmaceutical compa-
nies by extending market exclusivity protection to all orphan drugs re-
gardless of whether they are covered by patent protection."10' 2 Congress
explained that when the Orphan Drug Act was originally passed, the
prevalent belief was that drugs which qualified for patent protection
should not be covered by the Act because the patent incentive would be
enough. 103
However, Congress' belief soon changed. The investigating commit-
tee found that patent protection often failed to provide enough incentive
for development of an orphan drug that could be patented.'4 In some
cases the patent term could expire prior to FDA approval of the drug. In
other situations, the product patent could be held by an individual not
willing to use the product for the rare disease, or the issuance of the use
patent could be precluded by prior academic research. I0 5 Therefore,
some orphan drugs, though theoretically patentable, were not being de-
veloped. The amendment thus sought to provide some further incentive
for the development of these drugs.106
Congress gave three explicit reasons for the 1985 amendment."0 7
First, under the patent laws, the maker of an "orphan drug" cannot rely
99. "As originally enacted, the Act limited the availability of exclusive marketing rights
to drugs 'for which a United States Letter of Patent may not be issued ....' " Id
100. H.R. REP. No. 153, supra note 13, at 3, reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 303.
101. Id. at 4.
102. Thomas, supra note 87, at 417.
103. H.R. REP. No. 153, supra note 13, at 3, reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 303.
104. Id. at 3-5.
105. Genentech, Inc. v. Bowen, 676 F. Supp. 301, 305 (D.D.C. 1987).
106. H.R. REP. No. 153, supra note 13, at 4, reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 303.
107. Id. at 4-5.
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on a specific period of market exclusivity, while the Act provides a defi-
nite seven-year exclusive marketing period."0 8 Second, if a drug maker
had used the entire patent term for clinical testing, the amendment
would allow the maker to enjoy some further market exclusivity under
the Act.Y°9 Third, the amendment was intended to conserve governmen-
tal resources by having private drug concerns invest more resources into
orphan drug development. 1
3. Legislative History of the 1985 Amendment
The legislative history suggests that Congress did not foresee the
Orphan Drug Act and the 1985 amendment encroaching on or causing a
conflict with the Patent Act. The Orphan Drug Act, as drafted, only
provides exclusivity for a particular designated use."1 Furthermore,
"[i]n addition to being different from a patent, the period of market pro-
tection in section 527 [Orphan Drug Act] does not affect in any way the
term of a patent or the rights of a patent holder.11I2
The legislative history suggests that the grant of market exclusivity
would be subordinate to another's conflicting patent status. For exam-
ple, if one manufacturer held a valid product patent for a drug and an-
other held orphan drug status for the same product, product patent
status would prevail over any rights granted under the Orphan Drug
Act. Indeed, the legislative history provides that "[d]uring the term of a
patent, the Secretary would have no authority under section 527 to vio-
late the patent by awarding section 527 protection to anyone other than
the patent holder or its licensee."1 3 Thus it seems that Congress did not
intend for a conflict to arise between the Orphan Drug Act and the Pat-
ent Act. Furthermore, it appears that Congress intended that the Patent
Act should take precedence over any protection provided under the Or-
phan Drug Act. Nonetheless, Congress created the potential for conflict,
because now a drug that is patentable can also be granted protection
under the Orphan Drug Act.
108. "[A] patent on an orphan drug does not assure the patent holder a sufficient number
of years of exclusive marketing after FDA approval to recoup the cost of development." Id. at
4.
109. "[P]atented orphan drugs which would have no or only several years of patent protec-
tion left at approval need the same incentive of a seven year period of marketing protection as
do orphan drugs which cannot get a patent." Id. at 4.
110. "[I)f the Orphan Drug Act fails to provide sufficient incentives for the development of
these patented orphan drugs by private drug companies, the government will have to provide
grant funds to conduct the testing necessary for their approval." Id. at 5.
111. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-ee (1988).
112. H.R. REP. No. 153, supra note 13, at 6, reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 306.
113. Id. at 6.
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Apart from the legislative history, the answer to the question of con-
flict lies in the requirement that a manufacturer must receive a New
Drug Approval for any new drug it wishes to market. This NDA is nec-
essary whether the manufacturer markets the drug under either the Or-
phan Drug Act or Patent Act exclusivity provisions.114 Since one of the
requirements for receiving an NDA is that the applicant either must
demonstrate that the drug is not covered by another's patent or must
notify the patent holder,115 no conflict exists. Upon notification, the pat-
ent holder can choose either to sue in order to maintain her rights or to
acquiesce to the FDA's granting of orphan drug status to the appli-
cant." 6 If in the future the patent holder changes her mind and wishes
to enforce her patent, she may still do so. The decision not to sue before
orphan drug status is granted does not constitute a waiver to later in-
fringement suits against the orphan drug holder.
One problem in this bridge supplied by the NDA statutes is that
technically, protein pharmaceuticals are biologics and not drugs. Thus,
protein pharmaceuticals manufactured using recombinant DNA tech-
niques are governed by the Biologics Act 1 7 and are not required to get
an NDA. Under the Biologics Act, a manufacturer must meet standards
of safety,1 18 purity," 9 and potency. 120 Once these standards are met, the
manufacturer will receive a product license' 2 ' allowing her to market her
product. Thus, the manufacturer does not have to receive an NDA or
show that her product is not encompassed by another's product in order
to obtain marketing approval.
However, protein pharmaceuticals are more like drugs than other
biologics governed by the Biologics Act. Consequently, the FDA inter-
prets their marketing requirements much like it interprets NDA market-
ing requirements. 122 The NDA requirements, therefore, are implicitly
applicable to all protein pharmaceuticals, including those obtained from
recombinant sources. If this issue ever surfaces, the patent holder will
probably prevail over the product license holder, just as the patent holder
would prevail over the NDA holder.'23 Further, since protein
114. 21 U.S.C. § 355a (1988).
115. Id. § 355(b).
116. Id. § 355(c).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 262(d)(1) (1988).




122. Lecture by Charles Hoyng, associate at Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati, at Uni-
versity of California, Hastings College of the Law (Dec. 2, 1991).
123. See supra text accompanying notes 114-16.
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pharmaceuticals fit into the statutory definition of a "drug," '124 the FDA
could always choose to treat protein pharmaceuticals as drugs and re-
quire NDAs, thus eliminating the problem of conflicting protection.
B. Preliminary Application of the Act to Drugs Created Using Recombinant
DNA Technology
Not long after ratification of the Orphan Drug Act, courts had to
wrestle with the problem of two similar drugs competing for orphan drug
designation. Specifically, this conflict involved a situation where two
functionally identical drugs that were created using recombinant DNA
technology were both granted exclusivity under the Orphan Drug Act. 
125
The problem arose because of the court's use of the FDA's test concern-
ing differentiation among chemical compounds.
The problem in classifying different drugs for purposes of the Act
rested with the FDA's use of a chemical structure equivalents test when
differentiating the drugs. 126 Originally, the FDA applied this chemical
structure test to protein pharmaceuticals in a manner that allowed a
manufacturer who uses recombinant DNA techniques to "produce a mi-
nor variant of the pioneer's product and circumvent exclusivity by de-
claring the minor variant to be a 'different' drug. It involves making a
distinction without a difference."'
127
The problem with this differentiation test between orphan drugs
manifested itself in Genentech v. Bowen, a dispute between competing
manufacturers of human growth hormone (hGH), a purified preparation
of the naturally occurring hormone that is used therapeutically to treat
stunted growth in children resulting from a deficient pituitary gland.'28
In December 1985, the plaintiff, Genentech, received orphan drug status
for its drug Protropin (r-hGH), a drug whose active ingredient was cre-
ated using recombinant techniques and was essentially the same as natu-
rally occurring hGH. 129 The only difference between the hGH and r-
124. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g) (1988).
125. Genentech, Inc. v. Bowen, 676 F. Supp. 301, 311-13 (D.D.C. 1987).
126. Id.
127. Patricia J. Kenney, The Orphan Drug Act: Is It a Barrier to Innovation? Does It
Create Unintended Windfalls?, 43 FOOD DRUG COSMETIC L.J. 667, 669 (1988). Further,
"Technology has advanced to the point that traditional regulatory means of differentiating
among drug substances needs adjusting to adapt to the characteristics of these new biotech
products." Id. at 673.
128. Genentech, Inc., 676 F. Supp. at 306-07.
129. Id.
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hGH was that the r-hGH had an additional amino acid13° at the end of
its active molecule.
131
Six months later, the FDA designated defendant's r-hGH drug an
orphan drug.132 The only difference between the plaintiff's and defend-
ant's growth hormone was that the defendant's drug (Humatrope) was
identical to naturally occurring hGH and therefore lacked the additional
methionine present in the plaintiff's product. 133 Thus, the FDA granted
two different drug companies orphan drug status for what was essentially
the same drug.
134
The issue of what constitutes a different drug under the Orphan
Drug Act illustrates the problematic way courts interpret the Act's pro-
visions. Since a one amino acid change can easily be made without alter-
ing the activity of the compound, there is almost always an opening to
get market exclusivity for another's orphan-designated product. Thus,
under the Genentech ruling, one manufacturer could look to another's
orphan drug, change one amino acid in that drug, and get its own orphan
drug designation along with all the accompanying benefits. This result is
confusing, at best. In fact, what actually occurs is a "shared exclusivity"
between the pioneer orphan and the slightly altered orphan. Shared ex-
clusivity, however, is contrary to the seven-year exclusivity period built
into the Act. Thus, the Act was prime for regulations to clarify the
Genentech holding.
C. New Regulations
The Genentech court's interpretation of what test to employ under
the Orphan Drug Act was clearly wrong as it was applied to drugs manu-
factured via recombinant DNA technology. The FDA has realized that
as far as recombinant DNA technology products are concerned, a differ-
ent test than that employed by the Genentech court should be employed.
Accordingly, in January 1991 the FDA published proposed regulations
130. Id. (the additional amino acid on the chain making up the protein was methionine).
The additional methionine did not alter the effectiveness or activity of the hormone. Id.
131. "In terms of chemical structure, Genentech's r-hGH has the same sequence of 191
amino acids found in hGH, with an additional methionine amino acid group attached to one
end of the molecule." Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. The Genentech court held that defendant's hGH product was sufficiently different
from hGH derived from natural pituitary to justify defendant's orphan drug designation sta-
tus. However, the court failed to indicate whether plaintiff's orphan drug barred the subse-
quent designation of methionyl-free hGH as an orphan drug. "The Court expresses no opinion
on the still-pending issue of whether Protropin's orphan drug exclusivity barred approval of
Humatrope, and, in particular, sets down no universal rule for determining whether two drugs
are "different" for the purposes of the Orphan Drug Act." Id. at 313.
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defining the differentiation standards governing recombinantly engi-
neered proteins under the Orphan Drug Act.
135
In support of the new regulations, the FDA acknowledged that, in
the past, it had used a chemical equivalents test to differentiate between
products for orphan drug purposes. 36 The chemical equivalents test fo-
cuses on the chemical composition of two drugs, 137 specifically focusing
on the chemical composition of the active moieties. 138 Thus, if two active
moieties differ by a single molecule, 139 then they will be considered differ-
ent products under this test.
Under the new regulations, the FDA decided to keep the chemical
equivalents test for drugs whose active moiety was a small molecule."4
"With respect to small molecules, it appears sound, for the purposes of
consideration of exclusive marketing under the Orphan Drug Act, to
adopt a policy that regards two drugs as different if they differ with re-
spect to the chemical structure of their active moieties.""'' The main
policy behind keeping this test for small molecules is that the FDA be-
lieves a chemical difference in small molecules is "highly likely to lead to
pharmacologic differences."'
' 42
However, the FDA chose to adopt a different test for
macromolecules, 4 3 possibly in response to criticism of the Genentech
court's handling of the Protropin/Humatrope dispute. Protein
pharmaceuticals are macromolecules and thus fall under the new test.
The FDA reasoned as follows:
Some degree of heterogeneity is common in the case of
macromolecules; if this were to lead to the conclusion that two prod-
ucts composed of macromolecules were almost always different, there
would be little or no exclusive marketing associated with
macromolecules, probably not the outcome sought by Congress in en-
acting the Orphan Drug Act. Also, unlike with small molecules, it is
possible to make changes in macromolecules that are very likely to
have no pharmacologic effect (e.g., a substitution of one amino acid for
another similar one at an unimportant site in the molecule), but that
could nonetheless defeat exclusive marketing if any structural differ-
ence were sufficient to make drugs different for purposes of orphan-
135. Orphan Drug Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 3338 (1991) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.
§ 316).
136. Id. at 3341.
137. Id.







drug exclusive marketing. Again, this is an outcome that might not be
consistent with the intent of the Orphan Drug Act.144
In the regulation, the FDA adopted a test for macromolecules, stating,
"[A] drug would be considered different if it were shown to be clinically
superior to an already approved orphan drug."' 45 Thus, a manufacturer
seeking to show that her drug is different from an already designated
orphan drug must show not only that the chemical natures of the two
compounds differ, but also that her second drug is clinically superior in
some way to the pioneer orphan. Such clinical superiority could be
shown if the second drug were more effective or safer to use.
The FDA's new test for macromolecules is a significant advance-
ment in orphan drug designation. Under such a test, Lilly's Humatrope
would not have gained market exclusivity over Protropin unless it was
clinically superior to Protropin. Since a one methionine difference does
not make Humatrope clinically superior, Protropin would have been able
to retain total exclusivity without de facto sharing.
In the future, a manufacturer of recombinant protein pharmaceuti-
cals will not have to worry that another could, in a sense, share exclusiv-
ity because of an insubstantial change. These regulations will be helpful
because they preserve the basic purpose of the Act. Thus, in adopting its
new test for macromolecules, the FDA has sufficiently adapted the Act
to the new recombinant DNA technology.
III
Altering the Scope of Product Patents Granted to
Protein Pharmaceuticals
As illustrated in Section I, the current scope of product patents
granted to protein pharmaceuticals is too broad and inadequately ad-
dresses the needs of today's growing biotechnology industry. The courts,
however, may be in the process of changing the scope of product patents
granted to protein pharmaceuticals. In making such an alteration in the
scope, the courts should take an analogous approach to the FDA's newly
adopted regulations governing macromolecules under the Orphan Drug
Act.
A. Courts Receptive to Change
One recent Federal Circuit decision suggests that the broad scope of
the Scripps Clinic purified protein patent claim will not be upheld in fu-
144. Id.
145. Id. at 3343.
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ture decisions.146 The dispute in Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical
Co. centered on the marketing rights to Erythropoietin (EPO), a protein
pharmaceutical that can be manufactured using recombinant DNA
methods.' 47 To understand how the Federal Circuit may have altered
the scope of the patent, it is helpful to understand the nature behind the
protein in question.
1. The Composition of Erythropoietin (EPO)
EPO is "a glycoprotein which stimulates red blood cell produc-
tion."14 8 It is therefore useful in the treatment of anemia. 149 Anemia is a
lower-than-normal red blood cell count condition and is a serious side
effect of other diseases, such as renal disorders. 5 ° Exclusive marketing
rights to EPO are extremely lucrative. Worldwide sales for 1991 were
estimated to exceed $1 billion. 5 ' Thus, the stakes over EPO are high,
and the contestants were willing to invest large amounts of resources to
keep the marketing rights.
1 5 2
2. The District Court's Decision
The conflict over rights to EPO arose between the product patent to
purified EPO held by Chugai 53 and the product patent to recombinant
EPO held by Amgen. 54 The district court held that Amgen had in-
fringed two of Chugai's product claims. The first claim specified, "Ho-
mogenous erythropoietin characterized by a molecular weight of about
146. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert.
denied sub nom. Genetics Inst., Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991) (mem.).
147. Id. at 1203.
148. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 706 F. Supp. 94 (D. Mass. 1989), modi-
fied, 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom. Genetics Inst., Inc. v. Amgen, Inc.,
112 S. Ct. 169 (1991) (mem.).
149. Id.
150. Id. Because EPO is produced in the kidney, when renal disease progresses EPO pro-
duction will decrease, and the red blood cell count will also decrease. EPO is a hormone that
is secreted from the kidney and circulates to the bone marrow, its target sites. In the bone
marrow, EPO acts on the cells destined to become red blood cells, bringing about the final
maturation process. EPO is a complex three-dimensional protein. In a purified form it can be
administered to patients deficient in normal EPO amounts. When the patient is supplemented
with EPO, the red blood cell count will often reach normal levels. Thus, the anemic effects of
a low red blood cell count can be avoided. Id.
151. Erdman, supra note 19, at 158.
152. The case was appealed from the district court and appellate court levels to the
Supreme Court. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 706 F. Supp. 94 (D. Mass. 1989),
modified, 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom. Genetics Inst., Inc. v. Amgen,
Inc., 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991) (mem.).
153. By the time of suit Genetics Institute had licensed its patent to Chugai, a Tokyo-based
pharmaceutical concern. 706 F. Supp. at 95.
154. Id.
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34,000 daltons'" on SDS-PAGE, I5 6 movement as a single peak on re-
verse phase high performance liquid chromatography 5 7 and a specific
activity 158 of at least 160,000 IU per absorbance unit at 280 nanome-
ters." 159 The second claim specified a way of administering the purified
EPO to the patient.1"°
Put simply, the district court held that Chugai's patent on a purified
composition of EPO was valid.1 61 In reaching that conclusion the court
followed the Scripps Clinic reasoning concerning purified naturally oc-
curring proteins. 162 Although EPO is a naturally occurring protein, it is
proper subject matter for a product patent because under Chugai's claim,
the EPO is purified. The purified EPO is analogous to purified Factor
VIII:C that was held to have product patent status in Scripps Clinic.
163
Under the district court's decision, Chugai could enjoin its competi-
tors from making, using, or selling EPO. 16' This broad patent right was
mandated by the Scripps Clinic decision. Under the Scripps Clinic rule
the scope of Chugai's product patent theoretically extended to other pu-
rified naturally occurring EPO, as well as purified EPO derived from
recombinant sources such as the EPO produced by Amgen.I 65 The prod-
uct patent scope in Scripps Clinic extended beyond purified human and
pig Factor VIII:C to encompass recombinant Factor VIII:C. Similarly,
the product claim for purified EPO covered purified recombinant EPO.
It followed that Chugai should enjoy exclusive rights to sell EPO in the
United States.
1 66
155. A dalton is a unit used to describe the weight of a protein or other macromolecule.
156. Sodium dodecyl sulfate-polyacrylamide gel (SDS-PAGE) refers to a process whereby
a solution containing the desired protein is placed on a column filled with beads. The column
acts as a sieve and separates the proteins in the solution according to size. Using this technique
the molecular weight of the protein can be determined. DAVID FREIFELDER, PHYSICAL BIO-
CHEMISTRY 283-86 (2d. ed. 1982).
157. This is another scientific technique used to separate and analyze proteins. Id. at 255.
158. Specific activity is a measurable characteristic of the protein. Id. at 133.
159. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 1991),
cert. denied sub nom. Genetics Inst., Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991) (mem.).
160. "A pharmaceutical composition for the treatment of anemia comprising a therapeuti-
cally effective amount of the homogeneous erythropoietin of claim 1 in pharmaceutically ac-
ceptable vehicle." Id.
161. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 706 F. Supp. 94 (D. Mass. 1989), modi-
fied, 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed.Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom. Genetics Inst., Inc. v. Amgen, Inc.,
112 S. Ct. 169 (1991) (mem.).
162. Id.
163. In an earlier opinion the court noted that Chugai had specified a product claim in its
patent. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 706 F. Supp. 94, 100 (D. Mass. 1989).
164. See CHISUM, supra note 53, §§ 1-50.5.
165. See Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, 666 F. Supp. 1379, 1400 (N.D.
Cal. 1987).
166. Amgen, Inc. 706 F. Supp. at 104.
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The district court's holding was problematic because it ignored the
issue of whether the recombinant EPO was in fact superior to the natu-
rally occurring EPO and whether the two proteins should be treated as
identical as a matter of policy. Even though Amgen's recombinantly
produced EPO was in some senses superior,' 67 the district court held that
Amgen could not market this drug. This decision was appealed to the
Federal Circuit.
3. The Federal Circuit Decision
The Amgen case was appealed to the Federal Circuit, where the
court made some significant changes to the district court ruling. The
resulting Federal Circuit decision can be read in two ways. The first
reading is more conservative and concludes by upholding the Scripps
Clinic rule. An alternative reading, however, suggests that the Federal
Circuit could be contemplating an alteration in the scope of product
patents.
There are several alterations that can be made to the scope of prod-
uct patents that would better accommodate recombinant DNA technol-
ogy. This section will examine three of these alterations and endorses the
one best suited to accommodate the biotechnology industry. If the Fed-
eral Circuit is moving in the direction of adopting one these alternative
scopes, the patent law will be better equipped to accommodate recombi-
nant DNA inventions in the future.
a. Literal Reading-Upholding the Scripps Clinic Rule
As stated above, a strictly literal reading of the Federal Circuit's
decision does not indicate a reshaping of the Scripps Clinic protein prod-
uct scope. It is true that the court declared Chugai's product claims in-
valid. 68 However, the court declared them invalid because it found a
lack of enablement of those claims.'
69
To have a valid claim, a patent must describe the invention in such
clear terms that one skilled in the relevant field can reproduce and use
the invention.170 This is known as "enabling" the patent, and it is a by-
product of the trade-off an inventor makes when she applies for a patent.
In exchange for obtaining a seventeen-year statutory monopoly, the in-
167. Recombinantly-produced protein is sometimes superior to protein purified from natu-
ral sources because it does not carry the risk of transmitting undetectable pathogens and is
often produced more inexpensively. See, e.g., Genentech v. Bowen, 676 F. Supp. 301 (D.D.C.
1987).
168. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1991),
cert. denied sub nor. Genetics Inst., Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991) (mem.).
169. Id.
170. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
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ventor makes available to the public all relevant information concerning
the manufacture and use of the invention. In this way, the invention
truly becomes a part of the public domain following the expiration of its
patent.
The Federal Circuit found that Chugai had not sufficiently enabled
its product claims.171 Specifically, it found that the claims did "not es-
tablish that [Chugai] had a workable method for actually obtaining the
pure material that it claimed." '72 The court based its conclusion on the
fact that the claimed purity for in vitro173 urinary EPO did not coincide
with the activity found in vivo.' 74 This disparity indicated that Chugai
had failed to obtain the purified protein it claimed and thus could not
enable another to do so. In addition, the court pointed to the district
court's holding that the claim of purified recombinant EPO did not en-
able one to obtain homogenous EPO.175 Based on these findings the
court concluded that the claims for purified EPO were invalid for lack of
enablement.
If the analysis is limited to the court's literal holding, then the rule
of the Scripps Clinic court is still good law. Thus, if Chugai had suffi-
ciently enabled its claims, the court would have affirmed their validity.
In other words, if the court had found that under the claims a homoge-
nous sample of EPO in sufficient purity could be attained as stated in the
patent, then the purified product claims would have been upheld, and
Chugai would have been able to enjoin Amgen from marketing its re-
combinant EPO. This conclusion is consistent with the Scripps Clinic
holding that a purified product claim encompasses not only that protein
purified from its natural source, but also that protein purified from a
recombinant source.
b. Alternative Reading
A broader reading of the opinion suggests that the court is ready to
alter the scope of the product patent. The court did not use the opinion
to set out such changes because the case before it was not an appropriate
vehicle. Three possible new directions may be taken by the Circuit when
faced with an opportunity to alter the scope.
171. 927 F.2d at 1217.
172. Id. at 1216.
173. In vitro means outside of the body, and in this specific case refers to the characteristics
of EPO in a test tube.
174. In vivo means inside the body, and in this case refers to the characteristics of EPO
inside the body.
175. 927 F.2d at 1217.
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i. Two Suggested Directions
One way to alter the scope of the product patent would be to hold
that a traditional, purified product does not encompass the same protein
as one made using recombinant manufacturing processes, as opposed to a
protein purified from natural sources. If this were the case, the recombi-
nant EPO of Amgen would fall completely outside the scope of the
Chugai patent, because Chugai's patent would only cover other purified
proteins obtained from natural sources, not Amgen's protein obtained
from recombinant sources. If the opinion does signal such a move in the
thinking of the Federal Circuit, then the state of intellectual property law
concerning purified proteins is undergoing a significant and needed
change. Under such a rule, early patents on purified proteins would not
be able to stifle subsequent advances in biotechnological methods for pro-
ducing proteins. However, this move would require the court to embrace
the legal fiction that the recombinant product was different from the pu-
rified product, even though both products are chemically identical. A
second remedy would be to allow patents only for processes. 17 6 If only
processes could be patented, the Amgen problem would not occur be-
cause the two protein products, though identical, would have been pro-
duced via separate processes. This solution, however, would require
legislative intervention.
ii. A Third Direction
A third direction would be to follow the FDA's lead in its treatment
of macromolecules. Recall that under the proposed regulations, only a
macromolecule that is clinically superior to the pioneer macromolecule
will be treated as a new drug. Similarly, a court should only uphold a
patent for a recombinant product if that recombinant product is clini-
cally superior to the prior purified product.
A court could effect such a change by taking a narrower approach to
the "usefulness" requirement. 177 For a composition of matter to be pat-
entable, it must be useful. 178 Here, usefulness could be equated to
clinical superiority. Such superiority could be satisfied via cheaper pro-
duction, or purer, more effective medicine. Incorporating this alteration
would effectuate the desired change in product patent scope.
This evolution of the law would be beneficial for both industry and
society because it would serve the policies of patent law but not preclude
advanced drugs from reaching the market. It would serve the policies of
176. See Greenfield, supra note 71.
177. "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or




patent law by increasing the information available in the public domain
and advancing technology. Recombinant DNA represents a significant
technological advancement over prior methods of harvesting naturally
occurring proteins. One need only look to Genentech, Inc. v. Bowen179
for an example. There, Protropin was essentially identical to the purified
human growth hormone from cadavers but did not carry the risk of
transmitting a deadly pathogen.
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Under the present state of the law, recombinant DNA products are
precluded from reaching the market if a patent for the purified product
from a conventional source is held by another. Thus, a recombinant
DNA inventor may conclude that research is not warranted in the field
because she would be unable to recover costs, much less make a profit, on
any resulting invention. Under this third solution, however, because the
recombinant product would clearly be clinically superior, the patent
could be issued. If the recombinant DNA inventor can proceed with the
knowledge that her patent will not be automatically precluded by some
earlier purified protein product patent, technology will continue to ad-
vance because inventors will see the potential to reap a monetary reward
for their labors.
Changing the law would also be beneficial to society because ad-
vanced and improved versions of pharmaceuticals would be made avail-
able to the public. Often, recombinant DNA products can be produced
and marketed at a lesser cost than products manufactured using tradi-
tional purification methods. Additionally, these products can be ob-
tained in a purer form than products obtained using traditional
purification procedures. Thus, recombinant DNA products can repre-
sent significant improvements over older products. Under existing law,
however, society may not benefit from recombinant DNA advances be-
cause the advances may be stifled by prior patents of purified naturally
occurring proteins.
As discussed above, the Amgen court did not specifically address the
scope of purified product claims. Instead, it reached its holding by rely-
ing on other findings, specifically lack of enablement. Unfortunately, by
doing so the Federal Circuit sidestepped the opportunity to make an im-
portant advancement in the law and to limit the scope of purified product
patents.
The Federal Circuit may have sidestepped the issue because it felt
that Amgen was an inappropriate case to serve as a vehicle for advancing
the law. Because the court found Chugai's claims invalid for lack of en-
179. Genentech, Inc. v. Bowen, 676 F. Supp. 301 (D.D.C. 1987).
180. Id. at 306.
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ablement, any statement regarding the scope of valid purified product
patents would have been dictum. Perhaps the court is waiting for a bet-
ter case, one where a valid purified product protein product patent is
squarely in conflict with a valid recombinant DNA product. When such
a conflict arises, the court will have to address these issues and decide
whether it will follow Scripps Clinic, or limit the scope of product patents
on proteins derived from natural sources."18
IV
Conclusion
Recombinant DNA technology has created new sources of naturally
occurring proteins and revolutionized the protein pharmaceutical indus-
try. Laws regulating the marketing rights to protein pharmaceuticals are
slowly but surely adapting to the advances presented by recombinant
DNA. The marketing rights granted under the Orphan Drug Act have
been modified by the FDA's recent proposed regulations, which suffi-
ciently adapt the law to the issues raised by genetically engineered pro-
tein pharmaceuticals. These proposed regulations are a good example of
how existing law can be modified to address new technology, such as
recombinant DNA.
The marketing rights to pharmaceuticals granted under the Patent
Act should be similarly adapted to address the issues raised by recombi-
nant technology. As seen in the Amgen opinion, just such an adaptation
in the patent law may currently be gaining support in the Federal Cir-
cuit. In order to promote the science of recombinant DNA and benefit
society, the Federal Circuit should overrule the Scripps Clinic decision
and treat purified products from recombinant sources differently than
purified products from natural sources, provided the recombinant prod-
uct is clinically superior to the natural product. The Amgen opinion may
indicate just such an inclination on the part of the Federal Circuit.
Such an opportunity may soon present itself. Recently, Amgen sued
Chugai in federal district court over the rights to market human granulo-
cyte colony stimulating factor (G-CSF), a drug useful in treating patients
undergoing chemotherapy."8 2 As in the case regarding the rights to
EPO, Amgen has the patent for genetically engineered G-CSF, while
181. Another reason that the court may have hesitated to make such a change in the law is
that it felt legislative change, and not judicial action, may be the most appropriate way to
accommodate the new recombinant DNA technology. This, however, is doubtful, because the
original law as it related to purified protein product claims is a creation of judicial decision.
Thus, judicial fiat is the more appropriate way to limit the scope of the existing law so as to
accommodate recombinant DNA technology.
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Chugai has patents to purified G-CSF from natural sources. 113 The dis-
trict court should take the opportunity to adapt the law to recombinant
DNA technology and treat the two products as different if Amgen's is
clinically superior to the previous product. Under such a ruling, both
companies' patents would be valid, and the product that was the most
effective and least expensive, i.e., the clinically superior product, would
prevail in the market. In such a case, the patient who needs the pharma-
ceutical would be the ultimate winner.
183. Id.
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